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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 227420

FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 7076, SENT SECSTATE, INFO ATHENS,
LONDON, NICOSIA, USUN, NATO, ADANA, ISTANBUL, IZMIR, EUCOM,
CINCUSAFE, USCINCEUR, SEPT 16:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 7076

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, TU, CY

SUBJ: TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS VS A CYPRUS COMPROMISE

1. AS IN THE RECENT 194- DAY GOVERNMENT CRISIS, WHEN TURKISH
NATIONAL INTERESTS DRIFTED WHILE PARTISAN GAINS WERE PURSUED, THE
POLITICS-AS-USUAL APPROACH OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL LEADERS WAS AGAIN
REFLECTED IN THE GOT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO JOIN DENKTASH IN TAKING RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR DISCUSSING TERRITORY WITH CLERIDES BEFORE OR DURING
THE NEW YORK TALKS. THE PLACING OF PARTISAN POLITICS ABOVE NATIONAL
INTEREST HAS PLAGUED THE CYPRUS ISSUE THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR, START
-
ING WITH ECEVIT'S RESIGNATION (IN THE HOPE OF GAINING STRENGTH IN
EARLY ELECTIONS) LAST SEPT 17.

2. CLEARLY THE ARMS EMBARGO HAS BOTH ADDED TO THE POLITICAL RISKS OF
MAKING CNCESSIONS ON CYPRUS AND STIRRED SULLEN RESISTANCE AND RESENT-
MENT AMONG THE LEADERS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS TO THE CREDIT OF THE
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CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND ITS PREDECESSOR THAT THEY SHOWED RESTRAINT IN

RETALIATING AGAINST THE U.S. PRESENCE HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EMBARGO, WHEN THEY COULD HAVE INDULGED IN CHEAP POLITICS AT OUR EXPENSE. BUT DURING A PERIOD WHEN TURKEY'S NATIONAL INTEREST IN A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN IN NEED OF BOLD LEADERSHIP TO BUILD SUPPORT AND ISOLATE OPPOSITION TO A COMPROMISE, THERE HAS BEEN A NEAR-TOTAL REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY OF THE POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED.

3. AGAINST THE DISCOURAGING HISTORY OF THE LAST YEAR, THE KEY QUESTION NOW IS: WHEN COULD TURKEY'S DOMESTIC POLITICS PERMIT THE GOT TO COMPROMISE ON CYPRUS? THE TURKISH SIDE AT NEW YORK MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO RPT NO CHANGE IN THE GOT POSITION CAN BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE OCTOBER 12 ELECTIONS FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE SENATE. THE IMPACT OF THOSE ELECTIONS ON THE DEMIREL GOVT, AS NOTED IN ANKARA 6935, COULD RANGE FROM REINFORCING IT TO GRAVELY WEAKENING IT. IN TERMS OF CYPRUS POLICY, THE BROAD ALTERNATIVES APPEAR TO BE THESE:

A. DEMIREL WINS (I.E., HIS JUSTICE PARTY TAKES A RESPECTABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTE IN COMPARISON WITH THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, AND ERBAKAN'S NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE)--

(1) IF BY THAT TIME THE ARMS EMBARGO HAS BEEN LIFTED, DEMIREL WOULD HAVE GREATER FREEDOM TO MAKE AN EFFORT FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. HE COULD TRY THE INTER-PARTY COMMITTEE APPROACH THAT CAGLAYANGIL MENTIONED TO SAUVAGNARGUES (STATE 215656). HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS TURNED DOWN HIS PREVIOUS REQUESTS FOR COLLABORATION BY REMINDING HIM THAT HE ALREADY HAS A COALITION AND IT IS THE GOVT'S DUTY TO MAKE POLICY AND THE OPPOSITION'S DUTY TO SIT IN JUDGMENT. THUS AT SOME POINT DEMIREL PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO TAKE ON HIMSELF THE DISTASTEFUL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CYPRUS COMPROMISE. IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD HE WIN THE ELECTION AND SHOULD THE EMBARGO BE REMOVED, WE THINK HE WILL MAKE AN INCREASED "TRY". THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A "TRY" REMAINS, OF COURSE, UNCERTAIN.

(2) IF THE EMBARGO IS MAINTAINED, ITS MULTIFACETED AND GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES (ANKARA 6860 & CONFIDENTIAL

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6861) WOULD TEND BOTH TO ABSORB THE GOT'S FULL ATTENTION AND PROBABLY TO STIFFEN ITS RESISTANCE TO MAKING CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS. WE DO NOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT THE THEORY THAT ONCE HAVING "PROVED ITS VERILITY" BY MOVING VERY HARD AGAINST US, IT MIGHT FEEL FREER TO GIVE CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS; BUT WE DO NOT PLACE MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THIS POSSIBILITY.

B. ELECTIONS PRODUCE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE--

(1) IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, WE BELIEVE DEMIREL WOULD ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE POLITICAL STRENGTH HE NOW HAS. WHILE HIS CHANCES OF SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE AS GOOD AS IF HE HAD WON THE ELECTION, HE WOULD AT LEAST BE FREE OF THE CURRENT ELECTION PRESSURES.

(2) IF THE EMBARGO IS MAINTAINED, ITS GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE AS OUTLINED IN ANKARA 6860 AND 6861).

C. DEMIREL LOSES (I.E., HIS PRINCIPAL COMPETITOR, ECEVIT'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, AND PERHAPDHPHE RIGHT-WING NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY AS WELL, WINS A MARKEDLY LARGER SHARE OF THE VOTE AT THE JUSTICE PARTY EXPENSE)--THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BE THE MAIN ALTERNATIVE LINES THAT DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT THEN FOLLOW:

(1) DEMIREL COULD HANG ON AS LONG AS HIS WEAKENED COALITION HELD TOGETHER. THE INCREASED ASSERTIVENESS OF A STRENGTHENED NSP IN THE COALITION AND A STRENGTHENED RPP IN OPPOSITION WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A SEVERE DISABILITY IN DEALING WITH CYPRUS AND WITH VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER SUBJECT. THUS THE GOVT WOULD BE IN A STATE OF NEAR-PARALYSIS IN WHICH, EVEN IF THE EMBARGO WERE LIFTED, DEMIREL WOULD HAVE LITTLE CAPACITY TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONFIRMATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD HAVE THE ADDED NEGATIVE EFFECTS CITED IN B (2).

(2) THE DEMIREL GOVT COULD RESIGN AND BECOME A CARETAKER GOVT WHILE THE PARTIES AGAIN SEARCH FOR A COALITION FORMULA. THE CARETAKE
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GOVT WOULD BE IN AN EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED STATE OF PARALYSIS THAN THE ONE DESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH. MOREOVER, AS THE PARLIAMENTARY NUMBERS SITUATION IS ALMOST EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS IN THE LAST GOVT CRISIS, THERE IS REAL PROSPECT THAT THE CRISIS WOULD BE SIMILARLY PROLONGED WHILE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AGAIN FAILS TO PRODUCE ANY GOVT--OR AT LEAST ONE THAT CAN GOVERN EFFECTIVELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE THAT THIS TIME WE WOULD SEE THE EMERGENCE OF AN ECEVIT-DEMIREL COALITION WHICH COULD PRODUCE A STRONG GOVT CAPABLE OF BEING CONCILIATORY ON CYPRUS. BUT DEMIREL'S LOSS OF THE SENATE ELECTION TO ECEVIT WOULD DISCOURAGE ECEVIT FROM COOPERATING WITH DEMIREL AND WOULD LIKELY ENCOURAGE ECEVIT TO PRESS FOR NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS. THUS THIS PROSPECT, WHICH CANNOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT, IS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN IT WAS UNDER EARLIER CONDITIONS.

IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE ALSO FOR THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THIS TIME--ALTHOUGH THEY REJECTED IT LAST YEAR--AN "ABOVE PARTIES" GOT THAT COULD HAVE FREEDOME TO DEAL WITH CYPRUS. AGAIN, IF EITHER OF

THESE TWO TYPES OF GOVT EMERGED, THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE CYRPUS ISSUE WOULD BE MATERIALLY AFFECTED BY WHETHER OR NOT THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN REPEALED.

(3) IN PLACE OF A LENGTHY GOVT CRISIS, PARLIAMENT MIGHT BE PREPARE
D
TO CALL NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS, WHICH NEARLY ALL OBSERVERS AGREE ARE THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. IF NEW ELECTIONS PRODUCE THE SAMB KIND OF EQUIVOCAL RESULTS AS IN 1973, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION WOULD OF COURSE BE NOT RPT NO BETTER. BUT IF THE RESULT IS DECISIVELY IN FAVOR OF EITHER DEMIREL'S JP OR ECEVIT'S RPP, THERE WOULD BE THE PROSPECT OF A GOVT EMERGING THAT COULD ACT MORE FORCEFUL
LY
THAN THOSE WE HAVE SEEN THE THE PAST YEAR.

D. AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, THE MILITARY COULD INTERVENE. A MILITARY-BACKED GOVT COULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE CYPRUS CONCESSIONS WITHOUT UNDUE CONCERN AS TO POLITICAL RISKS. BUT SUCH A GOVT, DEPENDING ON ITS MAKEUP AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD ALSO END UP TAKIN A VERY HARD LINE ON CYPRUS. THUS A MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHILE BRINGING WITH IT MANY OBVIOUS AND OVERRIDING NEGATIVES, OFFERS NO RPT NO ASSURANCE OF A MORE FLEXIBLE PERFORMANCE ON THIS.
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4. SUMMING UP, WE BELIVE THAT (PROVIDED THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED) THREE OF THE ABOVE POSSIBLE SITUATIONS OFFER THE PROSPECT OF AN IMPROVED GOT EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS. THESE ARE:

(A) IF DEMIREL WINS THE UPCOMING SENATORIAL ELECTIONS;
(B) IF THE ELECTIONS PRODUCE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION; OR (3) IF NEW GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE HELD AND ARE DECISIVE IN FAVOR OF EITHER ECEVIT OR DEMIREL. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVE
R,
WE CAN HAVE NO ASSURANCE AT THIS TIME THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT SEE TU
R-
KEY FALL INTO THE OTHER SITUATIONS WE HAVE LISTED WHICH ARE FARE LESS PROMISING. MACOMBER UNQUOTE. ROBINSON

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